Boeing Halts Production of 737 Max vs DFS

Boeing will halt production of troubled 737 Max airplane. It’s unclear how long the suspension will last.

Compare with CFD State-of-the-Art/NASA 2030 Vision vs DFS recalling that Boeing and its competitors are very conservative companies and penetration of CFD is gradual.

Yes, Boeing indeed took a very conservative approach when launching the new 737 Max by equipping a design from 1967 by new larger supposedly more fuel efficient engines, which had to mounted farther forward and higher to clear ground. 

The result showed to be an airplane with a tendency to stall in low-speed climb and turn, which must have come as a surprise, because the standard software for CFD Computational Fluid Dynamics used by Boeing does not have the capability to predict the complex flow dynamics of stall. 

But the design was kept by Boeing, in line with its conservative company strategy, and to fix the instability the MCAS software was installed with the objective to automatically pitch the nose down on input from an angle of attack sensor. But the system malfunctioned with catastrophic consequences. 

The idea has then, since the the 737 Max fleet was grounded in March 2019, been to improve the software to make it safe, but reauthorisation by FAA is dragging and may never come. So now the production is halted and may never be resumed. 

DFS Direct Finite Element Simulation from Icarus Digital Math  is new software for CFD with the capability if predicting full flight characteristics of an airplane including stability and tendency to stall, as a realisation already today of NASA CFD Vision 2030.  DFS comes with new mathematical theory explaining for the first time The Secret of Flight.             

DFS as new computation/theory is now being presented to Boeing towards evaluation of the new predictive capabilities of DFS and possible incorporate into the designs process. Big values are at stake.

The catch for Boeing is that if the Max requires stabilising software, then it will be very hard to demonstrate that the software always will operate as intended and thus for FAA to re-authorise. The other possibility is that in fact the software is not needed, but that requires predictive computational simulation capability at Boeing trusted by FAA, since real flight testing of extreme situations is hazardous. In both cases, both Boeing and FAA have a problem, for which the only real solution may well be to put an end to the whole story of 737 Max.

How long time would it take for Boeing to make a whole new design (for the new engine or better) meeting todays expectations, using a tool like DFS and then start production?  Two years?